The Taliban - Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group - Podcast

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, which brings education to national security. We begin with Chapter One: The Landscape, The People, and Islamism.
Chapter five examined the fall of the Taliban. It discussed the blueprint created in Bonn to promote sustained development and ensure military and political stability in Afghanistan. It examined the Taliban’s strategy, tactics, targets, and overall rebuilding efforts. Chapter six will explore the tactics in more detail. This chapter focuses on how the Taliban fight and kill.
From the start, the Taliban used a hide-and-wait strategy. Jallaluddin Haqqani, a seasoned anti-Soviet fighter closely linked with Mullah Omar, believed that, like the Soviets he helped defeat, the Americans couldn't sustain a long war. By October 2001, the Taliban moved most of their remaining tanks and artillery out of sight from U.S. aircraft. Taliban fighters dispersed in different directions.
Tough Fighters and Four-Legged Warfare
Throughout recorded history, Afghans have been skilled and determined fighters. Although the Pashtuns have long been the dominant group in Afghanistan, they haven't been the only revered Afghan warriors. Other ethnic groups, such as Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, have also proven their fighting skills. Early in the current war, the Northern Alliance—comprising Tajiks and Uzbeks—tested their mountain-fighting abilities against the Taliban’s military strength. Backed by U.S. tactical air support and military equipment, they performed well, especially in the mountainous north, as discussed in chapter four. Like their Taliban counterparts, many fought while climbing mountains in sandals and sleeping outdoors wrapped in blankets.
But the Taliban are especially persistent and clever fighters. From the beginning, they demonstrated military innovation, resilience, and determination. Their toughness and adaptability were clear early in the post-September 2001 fight, which worried U.S. military planners. Confidence in the early aftermath of the Taliban's fall started to fade as they successfully regrouped, repositioned, and built strongholds. Although still somewhat disoriented in early 2002, the Taliban mainly harassed Coalition forces through hit-and-run attacks and planning for future operations.
Taliban units not destroyed in late 2001 allied effectively with al Qaeda forces in 2002 and 2003 to develop and improve their tactics. Al Qaeda had expertise, and its operatives were trained in unconventional warfare. They studied warfare closely, and some leaders were educated and experienced in military matters. Al Adel, the al Qaeda military commander and insurgent theorist, strongly advised mujahedin to follow key principles to counter U.S. military superiority. First, convert large military units into small bands of fighters led by effective leaders. Al Qaeda found it easier and less detectable to control smaller groups of 10-15 fighters than to manage large units.
The second suggestion was to build defensive fortifications, called “trenches,” which were temporary dirt shelters placed near homes in Kandahar. Building close to homes was preferred over open fields to avoid potential bombing by Coalition forces, who might hesitate to target them out of concern for civilians.
Third, al Qaeda recommended conducting reconnaissance, setting traps, and raiding rather than executing large-scale attacks. They also emphasized the importance of acquiring anti-aircraft weapons since air warfare gave the Coalition a significant advantage. Fourth, as with other insurgent groups, they stressed the use of political rhetoric.
From the outset, tensions existed between the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Arabs often seemed patronizing, offering unwelcome advice and issuing orders they weren’t authorized to give in Afghanistan. Despite these tensions, many Taliban leaders recognized the benefits al Qaeda brought, including bin Laden’s funding, expertise, and committed fighters.
Profile 14: Mohammad Ashan: Home Alone
The Taliban are known for their ingenuity and battlefield skills, but many are not very sophisticated. This was evident in the get-rich-quick motives of Mohammad Ashan, a mid-level Taliban member in Paktika province, who casually identified a Taliban member on Afghanistan’s most-wanted poster to a Coalition soldier. Holding out an open hand with his palm up, he asked for the $100 finder’s fee. This amount is months’ income in parts of Afghanistan. Interestingly, the wanted poster bore an uncanny resemblance to the man demanding the reward. A U.S. soldier asked him, ‘Is this you?” Mohammad Ashan responded enthusiastically, ‘Yes, yes, that’s me! Can I get my award now?” Ashan was arrested, and it’s unknown whether he received the promised $100.00. “This guy is the Taliban equivalent of the ‘Home Alone’ burglars,” one U.S. official said. Another official scoffed, "Clearly, the man is an imbecile." an imbecile."
Thank you for listening to this reading from “The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group.” If you enjoyed it, please consider subscribing and liking it. Nothing in this book represents the official position of any person or agency of the United States government. On behalf of Kensington Security Consulting, thank you for listening.
 

Non-Violent Intimidation Tactics
The Taliban uses fear of impending violence. A common tactic is the shabnamah, or “night letter,” a message sent to a target that states they will face punishment. The message warns that unless demands are met, the punishment will be quick and severe. This theme recurs frequently. For example, in 2008, residents of Khost received a letter warning tribal elders not to cooperate with government forces, or else they would face consequences. Those working for the Karzai or regional governments were told to quit immediately, or else they would witness unprecedented violence. Anyone aiding government forces during a firefight would face the same fate as the "U.S. puppets," meaning they would die.
Information Operations
“The Taliban are lying through their teeth." – Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 2001, responding to early Taliban allegations of U.S. atrocities.
The insurgents, especially the Taliban, use media to spread propaganda. Their main themes include portraying the government as corrupt, illegitimate, ineffective, and controlled by Western powers; claiming Afghanistan is a battleground in an international crusade against Islam led by the U.S.; and suggesting Islam offers solutions to Afghan problems. The latter dominates in Islamist reformist circles.
The Taliban exploit national anxiety and unmet expectations. Disillusionment grew early in the insurgency as people’s hopes clashed with poor service delivery. Many Afghans didn’t understand why civilians, sometimes unintentionally, suffered casualties at the hands of Coalition Forces. The Taliban exploited this, using accidental killings as false evidence of American murderous intent. Today, the Taliban utilizes print and digital media. Their publication Azam, meaning "tenacity" in Pashto, was shut down in 2003. However, outlets like Al Somood and others continue in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Somood is their flagship paper, featuring glossy pages, statistics, and interviews, published by the Taliban’s media center, likely based in Quetta.
Taliban DVDs include poetry recitations, interviews with leaders like Jalaluddin Haqqani praising Islam’s virtues, and footage of executions of suspected enemies. Even the more graphic content is posted on their website, El Emarah. Topics often covered include Pashtun nationalism, Afghan patriotism, and anti-American sentiment. Guantanamo, often compared to Devil’s Island, is frequently criticized.
Some propaganda efforts have had an impact. In February 2006, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed concern that America was "losing the media war to Al-Qaeda.” Others agreed. For instance, in January 2012, U.S. Marines filmed themselves urinating on Taliban corpses, and a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed the authenticity, saying, “It turned my stomach.” The next year, U.S. soldiers posed with the remains of suicide bombers. Generally, the Taliban have struggled to get Western journalists to write flattering stories about them. An exception is Yvonne Ridley, who wrote in “In the Hands of the Taliban” that they treated her with courtesy and respect. She appreciated how the Taliban introduced her to Islam and believed Islam grants women freedom and respect. “My heart has been stolen by Afghanistan.”
However, even sympathetic reporters face risks covering the Taliban. Joanie De Rijke, a Dutch journalist, interviewed Taliban commander Ghazi Gul in 2009. After the interview and taking photos, Gul kidnapped her, held her captive for six days, and then ransomed her for an unspecified amount. Surprising herself, she later accepted the sexual violence, reasoning Gul was overwhelmed by testosterone and knew it was wrong. She described his treatment as respectful and generous. Gul offered her one of his wives for a threesome, which she declined, but she accepted tea and biscuits.
Chapter Summary
In 2001, Western and Afghan forces made significant military gains, driving the Taliban from Afghanistan. The U.S. received widespread international and domestic backing. Yet, the Taliban regrouped into four Shuras, with the main one in Quetta, Pakistan. The Taliban's hierarchy includes the top leadership, the Shura Council, cadres, foot soldiers, and mercenaries. The Taliban found sanctuary in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan and are now regaining strength, aiming to impose a new totalitarian regime in Afghanistan. They are one of several insurgent groups striving for a Salafist Afghanistan, alongside al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hizb el Islami. Their goals include crippling the economy, terrorizing opponents, expanding their base, strengthening external support, and breaking the will of nations, especially the United States.

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, which brings education to national security. This reading turns to the structure of the Taliban.
 
The Taliban’s Four Strategies
            The term “strategy” is key to the language of war. It refers to a broad plan of action to secure victory. These strategies aim to weaken Afghanistan’s economy, terrorize the enemy, increase their support base, and destroy the national will of states backing the current government. These four strategies remain central, and chapter six will detail the specific tactics. One primary Taliban strategy is to weaken the economy. Insurgents target the economy because a prosperous Afghanistan would strengthen the government’s credibility, attract more international investment—especially in natural resources—encourage domestic savings and investments, and develop human capital. Afghans would become stakeholders if they saw good returns on their investments. In turn, young Afghans would be drawn to vocational education and to fields like technology, engineering, and science that offer financial benefits. Talented Afghans might be less likely to spend their energy memorizing the Koran if they could pursue education that improves their living standards. That’s why donors in Bonn prioritized economic growth, and why the Taliban see it as a threat. Another Taliban strategy is to terrorize both Afghan and non-Afghan enemies. Fear successfully suppressed early dissent during their 1996-2001 rule. The insurgents have many enemies, including those involved in modernizing the country. They have targeted teachers, healthcare workers, public administrators, military and intelligence personnel, many NGO workers, and others seen as collaborators.
            A third strategy involves expanding the Taliban’s support base. This includes financial backing, access to weapons, and recruitment from across the Islamic world. In the 1990s, Pakistan provided millions of dollars, arms, and adolescents to the Taliban. The Pakistani connection to the Taliban persists. Pakistan has also supported other insurgent groups, as discussed in chapter eight. Along with domestic and Pakistani support, the Taliban continue to receive substantial aid from Arabs.
The fourth strategic goal is to undermine the resolve of the government’s international backers. The Taliban have made significant progress in gradually weakening the once-strong will of Western societies to sustain their military presence in Afghanistan, as demonstrated by polls. Five years into the counterinsurgency, President Bush grew concerned that American resolve would lessen as U.S. soldiers were killed. 
The Taliban’s Basic Sets of Tactics and Targets
The term “strategy” refers to the Taliban’s core military and political agenda. The strategy is implemented through “tactics.” The Taliban have successfully adapted their tactics to the environment and circumstances. There are three main groupings of tactics: violent attacks, non-violent intimidation, and information operations. The basic sets are discussed below, and the specific tactics will be discussed in the next chapter.
 
            Violent Tactics
 
            The first tactic is brute force. The mujahedin tortured and mutilated the bodies of Soviet soldiers, and some of these insurgents continued their brutal tactics in their next war as the Taliban. Since 2001, the Taliban has killed and injured their enemies during their ongoing campaign to conquer. Assassination and indiscriminate murder are proven, cost-effective weapons in an insurgency because of the fear they create. The insurgents have studied terrorist trends from Iraq and Israel and have determined that human and roadside bombs are highly effective. There are many targets for the Taliban. Some of the main target groups include education, communications, the civil service, and police and security forces, which are listed below.
 
Target Set- Economic and Entrepreneurial Enterprises
            One target set of the Taliban centers on businesses or businessmen who cater to affluent Afghans, foreigners, or pro-government personnel. Upscale hotels and restaurants are prime targets for several reasons. The Taliban and the Haqqani insurgents see swanky hotels as pretentious and view the proprietors and wait staff as collaborators serving a foreign, conquering force. These venues also attract the rich and powerful of Afghanistan. The Taliban also attacks cafes, markets, and shopping centers.
 
            The Taliban also terrorizes impoverished entrepreneurs. Attempting to support their families by selling second-hand goods, toiletries, DVDs, and cosmetics, these poor vendors expose themselves to the Taliban’s often-erratic and always-brutal moral codes. The Taliban morality police beat individuals who listen to music, wear Western clothes, watch television, or participate in all but the most Islamic and primitive activities. They also severely punish entrepreneurs who sell banned clothing, DVDs, and television sets. In doing so, the Taliban further limits Afghans' ability to earn a living.
Target - Education
            “Education is the factory that turns animals into human beings."  Ghulam Hazrat Tanha, the director of education in Herat.  "
            From the beginning, the Taliban persistently and aggressively targeted education.  During their 5-year rule, they shuttered schools, completely segregated the sexes, and purged the texts for what they considered un-Islamic elements. Today, out-of-power, the Taliban fear the power of education in building national capacity, empowering women, creating physical infrastructure, assuring competent administration, promoting job creation, and fostering a sense of national purpose.
             They attack a broad set of educational targets: students, teachers, parents, and facilities. Tactics include stand-off attacks, assassinations, murders, and morbid, disfiguring attacks, such as throwing acid into the faces of schoolchildren. One of the countless attacks occurred in August and September 2003, when the Taliban burned several buildings at an elementary school near Kabul and, as their standard modus operandi, left leaflets threatening to kill teachers, parents, and children should they pursue education. After the attack, nearly 200 of the 400 boys and girls stayed away for some time.
 
The Taliban’s intimidation worked and often still does. But out-gunned Afghans sometimes fight the Taliban. The Afghan villagers have organized broadly and often effectively against Taliban attacks on educational facilities, educators, and students.  By summer 2012, there were more coordinated, village-level self-defense efforts to save the schools. Sometimes with or without government help, villagers took up arms to protect their schools.  According to a report, a school principal organized 500 students to fight against the Taliban's attempts to shut down the schools in August 2012.
            Additionally, villagers have opposed the Taliban through non-violent resistance. Fully aware of the risks if they are caught, school teachers and administrators have kept schools open, often cautiously and secretly. They have hidden in guesthouses, teaching in small groups to minimize the chance of being discovered. In eastern Afghanistan, an underground education system has developed. Sometimes, government forces have kept Afghanistan’s schools open; other times, they have made compromises with the Taliban regarding school content and attendance. In some cases, the Taliban have shut schools completely.
Target – Communications
            The Taliban also targets communication systems and their operators. They regularly attack radio broadcasts and transmission towers. Cell phones have helped bypass older, less advanced forms of communication. Counterinsurgency forces use transmissions to fight the insurgents. The Taliban attacks towers and threatens to kill operators and technicians who maintain them. When these threats are credible, service is often disrupted during the night and sometimes during the day. The Taliban believes informants use cell phones to alert U.S. troops after dark. In neighboring Pakistan, Voice of America operators agreed to the demands of local insurgents to stop broadcasting. 
Target- Civil Servants and Police
            Taliban kill Afghans who work for the Kabul government and Coalition Forces.  From the beginning of the counterinsurgency, there was a limited pool of well-educated Afghans who had in-demand skills. They are called the "second civil service." These skills include English, technical skills—especially in information systems—and accounting. The Taliban need to kill these individuals or discourage them from aiding the government.
Of the civil service branches, the Afghan police have been the most targeted. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual clearly states that the police, not the military, are the front-line soldiers in counterinsurgency. As David Galula notes, the police are the government’s most effective and efficient organization for removing insurgent political agents from the population. For Coalition Forces to hold and develop an area, a credible police force is essential. Through daily interaction and relationship-building, police develop detailed knowledge of the physical and human terrain. They gather intelligence from local villagers about Taliban presence and identity. Additionally, there is a criminal motive for killing police officers. Because the Taliban engage in criminal enterprises, they oppose police who remain uncorrupted.
The Taliban employ various methods to kill and injure police. Many are killed by explosives, especially mines placed on roads. Sometimes, police officials such as chiefs are targeted. For example, in August 2012, the Taliban tracked the route of a police chief. When he traveled a route in Badghis Province, a roadside bomb was detonated, wounding him and killing others. Some attacks involve the Taliban impersonating police officers. In the first recorded attack of this kind, an Afghan policewoman killed a U.S. police contractor in late December 2012.
Taliban terror also affects the Pakistani police. In Peshawar, home of one of the four shuras, Taliban fighters often outgun their opponents and fight with brutal ferocity. A police inspector said in December 2012 that violence against security forces has damaged morale at many local stations and checkpoints, causing them to suspend night patrols.
Targeting Health Care Providers
The Taliban target health care providers, especially those connected to NGOs. Sometimes they kill these workers randomly; other times, they target specific health professionals. Superstitions can also drive kill orders. For instance, the Taliban and some Afghans believed that efforts to eradicate polio—long conquered in much of the West—were un-Islamic and part of American plots. In late December 2012, Western medical personnel were killed while administering polio vaccines.
As a result, some NGOs have pulled out of Afghanistan. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew early in the insurgency, in June 2004, due to their inability to protect their employees. MSF had served in Afghanistan for nearly 25 years. Other NGOs, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), have become wary.
Thank you for listening to this excerpt from “The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group.” If you enjoyed it, please consider subscribing and liking. Nothing in this book reflects the official position of any individual or agency of the United States government. On behalf of Kensington Security Consulting, thank you for listening

The Structure of the Taliban
            The Taliban is organized hierarchically from the supreme leader, Mullah Omar, to the foot soldiers. At the top, the Supreme Leadership, in conjunction with the Shura Council, gives guidance.  The cadre comprises dedicated mid- to senior-level operatives.  Foot soldiers are the rank and file of the Taliban. Finally, mercenaries are fair-weathered Taliban whose devotion to the ideology is tenuous and who serve for lack of better employment opportunities.
            Rings of Support
            The Taliban’s structure is hierarchical, from the Supreme Shura, through the foot soldiers, to the pool of mercenaries. But support levels can also be viewed as concentric rings. As with other insurgent and terrorist groups, such as the defunct German Red Army Faction, the Taliban have expanding rings of progressively weakened support.  There is a nucleus of hardened fighters and key decision makers at the Taliban’s core. The rings beyond this nucleus are increasingly less senior, though still important. 
            The ring beyond the inner nucleus is that of the active fighters. This nucleus is composed of the most dedicated and hardened, and usually veteran, support. Moving centrifugally, there is a second ring of active key cadre who serve as leaders and trainers. They, too, are veteran fighters but do not have the high-leadership position of the first-ring cadre.
            Beyond this ring is a third ring of active, non-combatants. They are active in the group's political, fundraising, and information activities.  They sometimes conduct intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safe haven, shelter, financial contributions, medical and transit assistance. They are particularly instrumental in madrassas, where they recruit and groom future foot soldiers and leaders.
            The fourth ring comprises passive supporters and sympathizers. They may not be aware of their precise relation to the terrorist group. Sympathizers can be useful for political activities, fundraising, and intelligence gathering, and other non-violent activities.
 
            The Committees
            Along with the four regional commands, the Afghan Taliban have 10 functional committees that address specific issues. Some of the members of the committees are also members of the Quetta Shura.  The committees are: Ulema Council, or Religious Council; Finance; Political Affairs; Culture and Information; Military Council; Prisoners and Refugees; Education; Recruitment; Repatriation; and Interior Affairs.  Figure 8 shows the committees and their functions.
            Funding
            In addition to trading in commodities, trafficking in narcotics, and running extortion rackets, the Taliban operate the informal money transfer system commonly known as hawala. In this system, money is transferred between two parties informally. There is little paperwork kept. These formal and informal value transfers enable the Taliban to sustain the organization.
            According to the Afghanistan Centre for Research and Policy Studies director Haroun Mir, there is a vast network of charities that solicit funds for the Taliban.  Much funding comes through rich donors in the petrol-exporting Gulf states. The funds are flowing through ghost charities. “Nobody has an idea where this money goes as it is being used by extremist groups to purchase weapons or recruit suicide bombers."
            Intelligence, Security functions, and Interrogation
            Intelligence plays a vital role in the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot match the military capabilities of the Coalition Forces, so they try to erode the will of the enemy through unconventional tactics. Without strong intelligence, the Taliban would not be able to commit effective suicide bombings, nor could they infiltrate the Afghan military, intelligence, and police effectively. Without effective intelligence, the “green-on-blue” attacks, Afghan soldiers turning their weapons on fellow soldiers and Western soldiers, would be very difficult.
            The Taliban’s offensive intelligence operations rely on human intelligence. These operations include pre-attack surveillance. They spread disinformation about Coalition Forces, gather intelligence-related data for use in green-on-blue attacks, monitor villagers' behavior, conduct surveillance of places and persons of interest, and engage in a wide variety of intelligence operations.
            The Taliban have experience in collection activity. During their rule, they had developed a quasi-totalitarian security apparatus to cement their Sharia-based theocracy.  Today, the Taliban has personnel who exclusively focus on intelligence and counterintelligence. They are deployed at the regional and provincial levels to facilitate the flow of information and to run informant networks. At least one Western official has stated that the Afghan Taliban have a de facto head of intelligence, although the identity of this individual remains unclear.
            Well-dressed Taliban, often young men, perform pre-operational surveillance. They photograph areas with digital cameras, obtain GPS coordinates, and watch people and places. Operatives will spend many hours observing who walks into buildings connected to intelligence or military services.  Some of the operators bring an array of sophisticated tracking devices and webcams, and are careful not to bring weapons.  In Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, the Taliban also reconnoiter cities from motor vehicles.  There are also countermeasures in cases where they are apprehended.  Files on Taliban computers are disguised under filenames such as “poetry” or “jokes.” 
            The Taliban are skilled at counterintelligence. They are capable at unmasking penetrations or double agents who are cooperating with Coalition Forces because the Taliban have extensive knowledge of the leading families, tribal elders, and widows in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. As in former communist states, they channel much of their limited resources towards spying.  This fits into the strategy of terror.  Taliban intelligence targets include Afghan government forces, Coalition Forces, military personnel, non-combatant, and foreign non-combatants.       
            The Taliban's mind is well-suited to intelligence, particularly counterintelligence. The mentality of the Taliban is one of suspicion and hostility to nonconformity. Its view holds that lying is as acceptable and sometimes required in defense of Islam.  The Taliban have a broad license to extract information through even the most grim interrogation techniques.  Taliban suspected of collaborating with Coalition Forces can be executed without appeal or pity, and their severed heads could be exposed on Taliban-run media.  Taliban mullahs justify the torturous interrogation by references in the Koran.
 

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. The reading examines some of the leaders of the Taliban in 2014.
 
The Leaders
            Mullah Muhammad Omar is the current leader of the Taliban and was profiled in chapter two. He is the Afghan Taliban's supreme leader, believed to be hiding in Pakistan.
            Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar - Generally considered the second-most important leader in the Taliban, Mullah Baradar is an intimate of Mullah Omar and was captured by the ISI. He is of the same clan and sub-clan as Hamid Karzai, a Populzai Durrani Pashtun. He was captured and imprisoned by the ISI. In late September 2013, he was released on the condition that he remain in Pakistan.
            Muhammad Hassan Rahmani - A strategist and leader, he was a governor of Kandahar and may be the shadow governor today. Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir - A commander of operations for southern Afghanistan. Captured in 2001 and held in Guantanamo until 2007, he was transferred to Kabul and freed in 2008. He is assumed to be active today, organizing attacks against Coalition Forces in the south. Zakir has charisma and experience, and should Mullah Omar be killed, he is a candidate to replace him.
            Maulavi Abdul Kabir (captured) - Commander of forces in eastern Afghanistan. Kabir was a member of the Quetta Shura.
            Mullah Abdul Razzak - Chief propagandist for the Taliban from 1996 to 2001, Mullah Razzak was arrested by Pakistan in 2003. He was released and rejoined the group, where he serves today as a strategist.
            Amir Khan Muttaqi - He currently heads propaganda efforts.
            Sayyid Tayyab Agha - The Taliban’s chief diplomat.
Peshawar Regional Military Shura
            The Peshawar Shura directs activities in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan. In many places, Peshawar resembles Quetta, with sprawling back alleys, bazaars, haunts, and slums. There is a similar atmosphere of anxiety in Peshawar’s streets because of the summary justice meted out by factions and tribes competing for control and power. The Taliban’s control of Peshawar ebbs and flows. The Taliban have enough control to enforce their puritanical Islamic code. There is a conflict with well-placed residents and old families who will not easily surrender their status or influence to the Taliban, whom they consider uninvited and unwanted guests.
            In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province, Peshawar is the capital. The Taliban have committed 1,962 acts of terror since 2008, killing 6,200 people and injuring more than 9,000 others.
Miramshah Regional Military Shura and the Haqqani Connection
North Waziristan’s Miramshah Regional Military Shura directs activities in southeastern Afghanistan, including the provinces of Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Logar, and Wardak. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, command an element of the Taliban that has far more independence than any other. The Haqqani Network has been described, incorrectly, as an entirely autonomous terrorist-narcotic gang. The Haqqanis have sworn fealty to Mullah Omar, though this arm of the Taliban has greater license to conduct independent operations. At times, they operate autonomously and in conjunction with other militant groups, including other Taliban elements.
In mid-November 2012, the father-son duo Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani indicated that they would participate in peace talks with ISAF negotiators if the Taliban agreed, with Chechens, Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and Afghans living in FATA. Its areas of influence extend from North and South Waziristan to Parachinar and the Kurram agencies, all in Pakistan. From these bases, the Haqqanis conduct attacks in the border areas of Paktika, Khowst, and Paktia provinces. The Haqqanis also had a strong connection to bin Laden.
Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura – Based in Baluchistan, this regional military shura focuses exclusively on Helmand Province and, perhaps, Nimroz Province.  
 
 

The Shuras
            The shura principle is rooted in the Koran, as noted in chapter one. It is a council that deliberates and passes judgment on social and political issues affecting the Islamic community, or ummah. Mullah Omar is, by far, the most important decision-maker, but he does not rule like a dictator. The Taliban Supreme Shura, heavily guided by Omar, conducts strategic planning, issues directives to regional commanders, and disseminates them to village cells as fatwas, or diktats. The village cell operates semi-independently, with minimal oversight from higher echelons. Sometimes the orders from the Supreme Shura are precise; often they take the form of broad guidance.
Quetta Regional Military Shura – Life in the Pakistani Badlands
            The term ‘Quetta Shura’ originated with Mullah Omar’s relocation of the Taliban organization to Quetta, Baluchistan, after spending time in Waziristan. In Quetta, Mullah Omar’s Taliban refer to themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Quetta Regional Military Shura directs activities in southern and western Afghanistan.
            Balochistan is impoverished, even by the standards of Pakistan, and seethes with resentment of federal governance. Some of the ethnic prejudices of Afghanistan pour into Baloch territory. As in Afghanistan, the Hazaras, who are set apart from many other South Asians by their distinct East Asian appearance, are relegated to menial work as a lower caste. In June 2012, a university bus filled with Hazaras was blown up, killing four. According to the Hazara Democratic Party, over 700 Hazaras have been murdered since 2002 in sectarian violence. The Baloch also feel exploited by the Punjabis, the dominant ethnicity of Pakistan’s 180 million. The police patrol just 5% of Balochistan. The rest is manned by tribal bands and 50,000 Pakistani troops.
            Today, Quetta, like the fabled outlaw territory of the American Old West, is a vast danger zone, and its inhabitants are often inclined to sling weapons. Many individuals, groups, and political cohorts live outside the law. In the 1980s, the city served as a sanctuary for anti-Soviet fighters and as a transit route, or “jihad trail,” for their supplies. By the 1990s, there were criminal enterprises, weapons smugglers, camps of Islamist and separatist fighters, adventurers, and desperados. Bin Laden was popular in Baluchistan, and by the late 1990s his smiling image was ubiquitous in shops and coffeehouses.
            For over 30 years, Afghans and Arabs have intermarried with local women, and many have obtained Pakistani identification documents. Today, the blend of cultural and national backgrounds makes it difficult to distinguish between some indigenous and Afghan residents. Reliable information about Quetta is scarce because so many journalists are killed, particularly those critical of powerful men.
            Death is common in Quetta. A woman professor of communications was shot dead in a rickshaw while traveling to a radio station. It was probably related to her politics. A former Olympian boxer was shot by unknown assailants for reasons unknown. The body of a boy, approximately 10 years old, was found in Quetta. He had been strangled and his body dumped by the road. In a tribal clash, three people were shot to death, including a woman. The assailants escaped. A much-respected Baloch scholar, writer, and poet, Professor Saba Dahtyari, authored 24 books on Balochi literature. He loved his Baluchistan, and many of his country’s intellectuals loved him. But in June 2011 he was shot and killed. Sometimes the sick and dying cannot be treated in Quetta. There are periodic strikes when doctors protest issues such as hospital privatization and low wages. These homicidal anecdotes represent the constant death that is daily life in Baluchistan today.
            Life has become progressively worse for women. By 2009, most restaurants had stopped serving women. At the behest of the Taliban and their ideological cohorts, owners posted signs stating, “For gentlemen only. Women not allowed.” Of Pakistan’s four provinces, Balochistan has the fewest per capita female health care workers. The Taliban are largely responsible for that.
            From early in the insurgency, some U.S. military and political leaders fulminated that Pakistan had turned a blind eye to the presence of the Taliban. Some drew analogies to Vietnam and the sanctuary in Cambodia that communists enjoyed.  In 2006, British Colonel Chris Vernon, Chief of Staff for southern Afghanistan, identified Quetta as the key center of operations.  He also accused the Pakistani military of training and arming the Taliban in Quetta. 
            For years, Coalition generals and diplomats have advocated a hard-hitting response. Lieutenant General David Barno, former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said, “The Quetta Shura is extremely important. They are the intellectual and ideological underpinning of the Taliban insurgency.” General Stanley McChrystal, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said the Taliban leadership was there. In 2009, General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, a White House official on Afghanistan, recommended extending drone operations to Quetta.
            The Taliban’s Leadership in Quetta
            Much as the political landscape of Baluchistan is, the inner workings of Quetta are shrouded in secrets. The Taliban’s leadership provides tactical direction and guidance to its fighters and commanders in the field. Senior commanders resident in Afghanistan travel to Quetta to confer on strategy, obtain supplies, provide intelligence, and receive instruction from the Shura. 
            The Quetta leadership typically sets goals at the beginning of the spring fighting season. The operational orders usually take the form of a planned offensive, subject to revision and adaptation. The Quetta Shura also provides tactical direction and guidance to its fighters and commanders in the field. The shura is composed of indigenous and foreign fighters. It serves as the nerve center for all of the Taliban's operations. Its leaders direct military strategy, craft policy and political and military strategy, appoint field commanders, and manage a shadow government. Fearing U.S. drone attacks, a large number of Taliban leaders have shifted from Quetta to Karachi, Peshawar, and other cities.
Profile 13 -Saad Haroon- Pakistani Funnyman and His Burka Woman
            “Burka woman I love you still; come on and give me a thrill.” From Saad Haroon’s “Burka Woman” to the tune of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman,” on Youtube.
            If anyone can find humor in the Taliban’s mounting menace in Pakistan and the generalized misery there, it is the U.S.-educated Saad Haroon. With his friend, the young humorist, he hosts a unique website from their Karachi-based home. He mocks the Taliban and the dreary life they seek to impose on his country. Armed with an indestructible sense of humor, Haroon is determined to fight the Taliban with jokes after witnessing a terrorist attack in Karachi that killed 140 people.
            Some topics are off-limits for comedic barbs. Jokes about the Pakistani Army or major political parties would not be a laughing matter to Pakistani authorities. Clowning about Islam could become gallows humor. But Haroon rips into burkas with a satirical song. A popular parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” is “Burka Woman.” In this routine, posted on YouTube, a young Pakistani man fantasizes about the female flesh hidden behind the burka. “My love for you grows every time I see your toes. Nail polish, Rrrrrrr," goes one line. "With your eyes, my mystery prize." One of his most popular jokes is, literally, toilet humor. He snickers that Pakistani public toilets are the dream of terrorists; they are biological warfare themselves.
His routine brings chuckles to the South Asian diaspora. He has performed in New York, London, and other communities with large Pakistani populations. Not everyone thinks he is funny, and some Pakistani elders are concerned that he is part of an Indian conspiracy to corrupt the morals of Pakistan’s youth. Others simply find his comedy stale. Still others salute his efforts to find anything funny about Pakistan or the Taliban. As a blogger wrote, “In general, Pakistan is just not funny these days. Bless this comic nevertheless; he has his work cut out for him.”
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            Chapter four discussed the Taliban’s downfall and the security and developmental priorities for the conquering nations, which met in Bonn.  Chapter five will analyze the specific target sets, tactics and their effects on the counterinsurgency with greater granularity.  This is a chapter on how the Taliban fight.
               The Taliban’s Diaspora
            Before its ejection in late 2001, the Taliban’s governmental structure was similar to those other impoverished Third World, one-party states. The Taliban had a monopoly on the use of force and law enforcement.  There were chains of command and a clearly stated, if not always followed, hierarchy of control from Mullah Omar to the regional bureaucrats. But communications were poor and effective decision making was often decentralized outside of Kabul and Kandahar.
 
            The Taliban had nothing that resembled a professional civil service.  However, there was a rank order of decision making in the Taliban. Most important decisions were made by Mullah Omar and religious clerics on the basis of their interpretation of religious law. Hiring and promotion was based on performance but also on cronyism and patronage. Within the government, there were rivaling factions, ambitious bureaucrats, petty arguments and other characteristics universal to large organizations.  When the Taliban became outcasts, they took this system of governance, with all its assets and idiosyncrasies, and adopted it to the circumstances and environment of their exile.
 
            Leaving Afghanistan, the Taliban looted what remained of the Afghan treasury. In early 2002, the Taliban traded in barter and began to expand its criminal operations. By 2011 the Taliban would raise nearly $400 million per year. This money would come from taxes, donations, and criminal enterprises, to be discussed in chapter seven.[1]
 
            The Taliban needed sanctuary. Mao Tse Tung, recalling his long march to escape Nationalist Chinese forces, defined sanctuary as a strategically located area where insurgents can train and build their forces. The area should provide limited freedom of movement but not for conventional maneuver. In sanctuaries, insurgents can supply, refit, and regroup free of significant enemy interference. The ideal local population would welcome the insurgents. In early 2002, the Taliban certainly found sanctuary in Waziristan. Waziristan is an autonomous tribal zone contiguous to Afghanistan. Stretching 1,500 miles from Baluchistan to the Hindu Kush, it is largely Pashtun, deeply religious, and, for the Taliban, friendly.
 
            When they were scattered into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, they were fortunate to have preexisting logistical networks, madrassas, and charities that served as billeting facilities and, later, bases of operations.  As in their earlier climb to power, or phase one in the government’s insurgency model, the Taliban forged amicable relations with local mullahs.  In FATA and the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP), renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Mullah Omar pooled his resources and lent his prestige to local chieftains, some of whom would emerge as important allies. 
            The Taliban improved relations with Baitullah Mehsud, who forged his local Taliban organization, the TTP, in 2007, as discussed in chapter eight. The bond between Mehsud and Omar was strong but sometimes ambiguous. Mehsud served as the subordinate member of this Taliban team from the beginning, even though he was hosting the fugitive Omar. Even before the TTP was formalized, Mehsud required his forces to prove fealty to Omar as their leader.
            The local Taliban under Meshud, in conjunction with the Omar’s exiled Taliban, imposed order on territories that had eluded the Pakistani government’s forces. They punished criminals swiftly and severely. They also suppressed or eliminated village elders who defied them. They enforced Sharia. The Taliban recuperated in Waziristan, and then many dispersed across different regions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Pashtun belt. Mullah Omar went south to Baluchistan, and so did many other Taliban.
            The Taliban received a warm reception from Quetta’s devout and elderly residents in the hardscrabble Baluchi capital. But not everyone welcomed them, and Quetta’s small middle class, particularly its women, detested them. The flood of unemployable and penurious Taliban youth put pressure on the already-fragile economy. Tourism, already weak, declined, and owners of the few cyber cafes faced uncertain prospects.
 
            Within 1 year, clerics openly preached hatred of America and recruited in the cities' madrassas and mosques. In the bazaars, the Taliban hawked jihad paraphernalia – taped speeches of bin Laden and bumper stickers advocating martyrdom. Quetta became no place for the liberal-minded.
 
The shura appointed four committees -- military, political, cultural, and economic -- to regulate all relevant matters. Other committees would be established. As of mid-2013, Mullah Omar led the Quetta Shura and the other three. He was presumed to live in Quetta. He was assisted by a staff with military and organizational responsibilities. Some of these leaders had overlapping regional responsibilities. The Afghan Taliban had regional military shuras for four major geographical areas of operations. The eponymous shuras were named after the areas in which they were based – Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah, and Gerdi Jangal.  
 
[1] “Report Says Taliban Raised $400 Million Last Year,” Radio Free Europe, States New Service, September 11, 2012.

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security.
To Educate a People
                       Before the Taliban, education was expanding, modernizing, and becoming more secular and accessible, particularly for girls. Elements of Afghanistan’s higher education system were a source of pride among Afghan Western-oriented intellectuals. In the 1960s and early 1970s, half of Afghanistan’s children had access to primary education, and Kabul University attracted the country’s top intellectual talent.
       By 2002, fewer than 40% of primary-school-aged children attended school, and only 3% of girls did. Secondary school attendance was 10%, and only 2% of girls attended. Almost 80 percent of school buildings had been destroyed. Many teachers and administrators had either fled the country or been killed. Those who remained had not been paid for 6 months. Beyond religious indoctrination, the Taliban cared nothing about education.
        The Bonn donors determined that literacy was a vital component of human capital. States with low literacy levels face a striking competitive disadvantage. Education would build the human capital needed to expand sectors of Afghanistan’s economy, empower women, create physical infrastructure, build a competent administration, promote job creation, and foster a sense of national purpose. Vocational education was particularly important because skilled workers are vital to the construction, maintenance, and repair of communication, health, education, and security-related facilities.
 
            Literacy has strong security benefits because education boosts military capabilities to fight the Taliban. Illiterate Afghan recruits could not be easily taught to function as soldiers. One soldier explained, “I face difficulties. If someone calls me and tells me to go somewhere, I can't read the street signs." But literate soldiers could serve as mechanics, medics, logisticians, and artillery specialists. There are also intangibles that boost morale in the Army. Literacy brings prestige, commands respect, and confers status and credibility. It brings dignity.
            There are secular, after-school activities. The new regime in Kabul brought Boy and Girl Scouting back to Afghanistan to supplement after-school education and instill values of consensual rule. First introduced in Afghanistan in 1931, scouting flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. Afghan Boy and Girl Scouts share the moral code of scouts worldwide, but there are unique elements. In Afghanistan, a boy can earn a merit badge for “identifying land mines and roadside bombs.”
 
            To Treat and Heal a People
            In 2001, donors in Bonn understood that Afghanistan was a profoundly unhealthy country. Throughout the 20th century, Afghanistan’s dismal health conditions proved to be an ally to Afghans in their wars against foreign invaders, from the British to the Soviets. In the 1980s, disease took a heavy toll on Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Among the diseases Soviet forces suffered from were Hepatitis A, typhoid fever, malaria, dysentery, and even plague.
            For this reason, the victors in late 2001 made health care a top priority, and U.S. military personnel and other counterinsurgency operators were well equipped to contribute. A key counterinsurgency-related health care goal was to develop and implement a basic health care plan with broad application that could deliver quick results. Taliban tactics proved effective in forcing out and keeping out foreign health practitioners. In August 2004, Doctors without Borders closed its medical programs after 24 years in Afghanistan.
 Profile 10:  Khorshid – Sunshine and Happiness
            “If you are scared you end up doing nothing and without doing you cannot achieve anything. But if you do things, all that can happen is you succeed or fail.” Khorshid
           
            Those who try to boost the mental health of Afghans face an ever-present sense of impending death. But this did not stop Australian skateboarder Oliver Percovich, who became a Kabul sensation in 2007 when he showed children how to ride his skateboard. The children loved it, so Percovich built a skateboard school called Skateistan to give them happiness and allow them to escape, if only for a few moments, the drudgery of their daily lives.
When Percovich arrived with skateboards, children would yell, “Ollie! Ollie!” The pitted, dirty streets of Kabul teemed with rocketing, beaming kids. They cruised, swooshed, collided, and jumped in Afghanistan’s first skate park and school, built by Skateistan. Ollie explained, “The boards are just our carrots. They’re a way to connect with the kids and build trust.”
 
Khorshid was a 14-year-old girl, born during the late Taliban era and into desperate poverty. She had her own skateboard, earned by volunteering as a skateboarding teacher for girls at Skateistan. She shared it with her 8-year-old sister. Khorshid had to persuade her mother to let her spend time away from hawking goods. But her mother agreed, and Khorshid lit up as she zipped on her board. Other girls looked up to her. If boys could skate, so could girls. The name Khorshid means “radiant sun” as well as “happy.”
 
People remarked on how radiant she was, particularly for a girl who lived in a home without electricity and sometimes went hungry. She was also a tough girl who supervised other girls and taught them to skate and stand up to boys. One of her students said, “She was very brave and gave courage to all of us girls. She was always telling us to be brave like the boys and then no one would dare to touch us.” Khorshid was a natural leader.
 
But this leader’s courage did not save her, her 8-year-old sister, or two other young up-and-coming skaters. They were selling trinkets in a park in mid-September 2012 when they were all killed by a boy about 14 years old, the same age as Khorshid, who set off a suicide bomb. The street was directly outside the NATO facilities that were the target. Had they left 5 minutes earlier, had the child suicide bomber changed his mind, or had the bomb failed to detonate, Khorshid might be skating today. She might still be teaching other girls to skate, be strong, and stand up to boys. Perhaps this natural leader would have become a national leader. But, as a Skateistan official wrote, “She was in the wrong place at the wrong time.”

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security.
To Build a Civil Service
            A quality civil service has been a key goal in developing Afghanistan. In 2001, the victors in Bonn found a hollow civil service. There was a lack of capacity and weak communication between Kabul and outlying provinces. Under the Taliban, public administrators were poorly and infrequently paid; unprofessional, as they were directed by theocrats; and marginally trained in public administration skills. They were also cowed by the mullahs who controlled important decision-making and could end their careers and even their lives very quickly. It was not surprising that post-Taliban donors to Afghanistan were alarmed at the lack of experience, talent, ambition, and general competence in the civil service. 
            An effective Afghan civil service would spur all other development sectors and increase stability. In larger cities, civil servants would issue construction permits; maintain basic infrastructure, including roads, power stations, water facilities, sanitation, and communications; and perform other civil service duties. This, in turn, would improve health, education, communications, the rule of law, and security. According to the plan, the government's credibility would be boosted if vital services improved, and citizens would become greater stakeholders in reconstruction and development issues. This would weaken the Taliban's attractiveness, and the Taliban knew it.
To Build Communications
            Economists in Bonn concluded that improvements in communications would spur growth across all development sectors. The Afghan economy would grow if costs, expenses, and demand levels were communicated broadly. Civil servants in Kabul needed to communicate with counterparts in the provinces for administrative purposes, and the education and health sectors were dependent on harnessing the power of the internet to modernize. Increased security required soldiers to communicate at all levels, particularly for close-support combat operations and for the rule of law.
            In a country that is isolated, illiterate, and unstable, the side that can better communicate its agenda and coordinate civil and military operations has a distinct advantage. In addition to telephonic communications, radio communications are particularly important in Afghanistan because of the extraordinarily high level of illiteracy. In some areas, the female illiteracy rate is nearly 99%. Radio is the only way the government can communicate its democratization programs, advise farmers on agricultural issues and families on health issues, and warn of security threats by the Taliban. Strong communications enable villagers to contact the ANA, ANP, or ISAF operators. For this reason, the insurgents have placed a high premium on destroying radio towers and have stepped up their use of radio technology to communicate their political agenda. This battle for the “information space” in Afghanistan continues.
Profile 9: Zakia Zaki and her Voice of Peace
            Atop a hill in a lush landscape 70 kilometers north of Kabul, Zakia Zaki and her husband broadcast to 200,000 listeners 4 hours each day. A pioneer woman in Afghan broadcasting, her “Voice of Peace” was initially funded by the French in a Tajik locale in the Panjshir Valley. Its warm voice resonated as an alternative to the Taliban’s cold message of absolute obedience. Her hero was Ahmed Shah Massoud, who helped win the financial support necessary to keep the old equipment running and the staff paid. 
            When the Coalition invaded in 2001, the U.S. continued funding the station to broadcast local news, women’s issues, music, children’s shows, and household and educational programs. The dark-complexioned, 35-year-old Zakia explained in 2004, “This is the only place where they (women) dare to speak out.” She received warm letters from all over Parwan, Kapisa, and Kabul provinces. An inviting sign on the studio’s door read “Voice of Peace” above a picture of a flying dove and a pretty, smiling woman. But inside the broadcasting facility, there was an ambient dread of Taliban attacks. The night letters came, and so did verbal threats. This did not deter Zakia, who was also a teacher, loved by her students.
            In June 2007, as Zakia slept with her 20-month-old infant in her arms in her Kabul home, two Taliban entered and shot her seven times in the head, blowing off half her face. Her 8-year-old son was in the room, too. Immediately, the Taliban called other women journalists, chuckling, boasting, and threatening, “At least people can recognize her from one side of her face. We will shoot your face, and nobody will recognize you.” Another threat came soon, “Daughter of America! We will kill you as we killed her.”
            Zaki was neither the first nor the last female broadcaster killed. In 2005, Shaim Rezayee, an Afghan video jockey who spun popular tunes and dressed in jeans, was shot and killed. After Zaki was shot, another newscaster was murdered in her home. Police apprehended six suspects in Zaki's killing, but they were all released. Authorities determined there was not enough evidence to secure a conviction. a conviction.

Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security.
To Build an Army
In 2002, Afghanistan lacked a professional army, and one had to be built to maintain order and prevent the Taliban’s return. The Army’s facilities had been shattered during the incessant wars of the previous 2 decades. The military’s leadership was sapped, and most of the weapons were antiquated and unserviceable. The last military entity that could reasonably be classified as an Army crumbled with Dr. Mohammad Najibullah’s Soviet-supported regime in 1992.
 
What remained was a large pool of guerrilla fighters tied to regional militias or, later, to the Taliban. There was no standardized training, career advancement, nationwide billeting program, unified ranking system, or other indicators of a modern, professional army. Developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), became a top priority for Western donors to Afghanistan, particularly the United States.
               An important early security task for the new Army was disarming many Afghans, particularly the Taliban. That would be difficult because firearms hold an important place in Afghan culture. Effective, unified, and credible armed forces could not exist until local militias and former Taliban surrendered most of their weapons, particularly crew-served weapons. A strong security apparatus—robust military capabilities, effective paramilitary forces, and strong civil-military relations—would shore up the government. It would also underscore the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
 
            Many Afghans, particularly those living in areas contiguous to Pakistan, vacillated between periods of optimism, pessimism, confusion, and fatigue as they tried to gauge the staying power of government forces in contested areas. The Afghan government determined that reintegrating militias into a unified, ethnically balanced, well-armed, and well-trained military force would win the confidence of doubting Afghans.
            In building the Afghan Army, there were knotty problems from the beginning, such as high levels of desertion, drug use, illiteracy, and national confusion. The early record of building the Army was mixed. It was commanded by maladroit leaders, offered meager pay, provided uncomfortable billeting and foul food, and made little effort to retain the services of young men who were away from home for the first time.  The high rates of desertion declined by 2009, but still remain high.  The lower rate of desertion was attributed to a presidential decree criminalizing unauthorized leave, a media campaign to discourage it, and higher unemployment. It also indicates that employment in the Army became more attractive to many soldiers.  But in summer and fall 2012, the Army was plagued with a desertion rate somewhere between 14%-20% per year, which is staggering.
To Build a Police Force
“I need 20 good police officers, and could use 100. Good people, not any hashish smokers. And I need sleeping bags and mattresses and a generator for power.” Lt. Col. Amanuddin, Afghan police supervisor, early 2008
Some of the conferees in Bonn in 2001 recognized the importance of a strong national police. They looked to history. In the early 20th century, then-Captain John Pershing built a constabulary force in the Philippines, which became a model for future counterinsurgency operations. Strong policing helped establish zones of security. As the French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula noted, police help identify insurgents and their supporters. Today’s U.S. Army counterinsurgency field manual states that the police, not the military, are the front-line forces in a counterinsurgency.
 
This applies to Afghanistan. In rural Afghanistan, the police are responsible for maintaining security, addressing community problems, and brokering disputes. Police interact with the public daily, forging ongoing relationships with key community members. Through these daily interactions and relationships, police develop intimate knowledge of the physical and human terrain. For these reasons, the Taliban made the police primary targets for death and intimidation.
            Some of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Interior Ministry Forces have become effective at patrolling.  However, there is a strong consensus that the overall ANP training program has been weak.  The poor quality of the police was, and remains, a large problem for the public administration and security sectors of human development.  The police force was rampant with tribalism and favoritism, which has played into the hands of the Taliban.  
Profile 8: The “Gangster” Policewoman of Kandahar
 "You have long mustaches, but you have no bravery.”  Officer Malalai Kakar to fellow police officers who ran from the Taliban in a gun fight
                      Like her father and brothers before her, Malalai Kakar was determined to become a police officer. She entered the police academy at 15 and became an officer in 1982. “I’m very famous as a dangerous person in Kandahar. People fear me.” The 5-foot dynamo earned this local fear, as well as nationwide respect, by standing firm when men fled in the face of the Taliban. She also grappled, literally, with street-thug violence. She explained that her arms bore scars from a suspect’s teeth marks after she wrestled him to the ground and arrested him. She called herself “part gangster.” But women in Kandahar loved and trusted her, coming to her to plead for protection from abusive husbands.
            Tales of her bravery served as a recruiting tool at a time when many Afghan city police forces, particularly in Kandahar, were seeking more women recruits. In 2006, 10 men reported to her in the field. “She is higher-ranked than me,” explained a young male subordinate. “So she has to give orders, and I have to obey.” She had long shed her burka and, when she became Kandahar’s first woman investigator, began wearing a man’s loose-fitting police uniform and visibly carrying sidearms. In her office, she adjudicated problems with an emphasis on domestic abuse. Malalai became a touchstone for Afghan police officers.
            During the Taliban era, while living in Pakistan, she married a Western-oriented United Nations employee and, by 2008, had five children. She would prepare breakfast each morning, usually green-onion pancakes. On September 30, 2008, while leaving for work with one of her sons, she was shot in the head by the Taliban, killing her at the scene. Later, at the ribbon-cutting ceremony of the Malalai Kakar Women Police Training Center, which opened in December 2009, Malalai’s father said, “Malalai was proud to serve her country. I thank the United States for making this possible.”